Franz Dietrich
‘Economics & Philosophy’
Normative Uncertainty
How should one evaluate options when one is uncertain about the correct standard of evaluation, perhaps due to conflicting normative intuitions? Such 'normative' uncertainty differs from ordinary 'empirical' uncertainty. While empirical uncertainty is at the heart of rational-choice theory, normative uncertainty has recently become prominent in philosophy. Jointly with Marc Fleurbaey and our student Brian Jabarian, I have begun to explore normative uncertainty from formal and philosophical perspectives. For instance, to what extent can standard choice-theoretic uncertainty (not) capture normative uncertainty? What decision rules are appropriate if we face normative as well as empirical uncertainty? A solid axiomatic approach will help, but the philosophical dimension should not get lost on the way.
Related Work
- Axiomatic foundations of normative uncertainty (with B. Jabarian) [preliminary draft available on request]
- The risk attitude under normative uncertainty (with B. Jabarian) [preliminary draft available on request]
- Decision under normative uncertainty (with B. Jabarian), Economics and Philosophy 38(3): 372-394, 2022 → Official Version